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ESTABLISHING SHARED SECRET
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A short guide to quantum hardware encryption and almin™ Seal September 2026

Sealed today. Safe from tomorrow.

almin™ Seal is a free, single-file, browser-based tool that seals files against today's attackers and tomorrow's quantum computers, without any quantum hardware of its own. It runs entirely in your browser. Nothing is uploaded, ever.

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ML-KEM · X25519 · AES-256-GCM No install · No account · No server Works with the network disconnected
Scroll to decrypt the story
CHAPTER 01 The threat that predates the computer that causes it

Harvest now, decrypt later.

No quantum computer today can break the encryption protecting your files. True, and beside the point. An adversary who cannot break your encryption today does not need to. They can copy the encrypted file, store it, and wait. Storage is cheap. The file only needs to still matter when the wait is over.

One file. Fifteen years. Four moments.
TODAY
+5 YEARS
+10 YEARS
+15 YEARS
MOMENT 01 / CAPTURE

Today, an adversary quietly copies your encrypted file. They can't read it. They don't need to.

MOMENT 02 / STORAGE

They store it. Storage is cheap. Medical records, contracts, source code: anything with a shelf life longer than a decade.

MOMENT 03 / ARRIVAL

A cryptographically relevant quantum computer arrives. Most serious estimates put the possibility inside a ten-to-fifteen-year window.

MOMENT 04 / EXPOSURE

RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange fall to Shor's algorithm. Everything captured becomes readable, all at once.

“The lock on the front door can be excellent; it doesn't matter if someone can walk in through a window a quantum computer will eventually open.”

AES is not the problem

Grover's algorithm only halves AES-256's effective strength to ~128 bits, still far beyond any foreseeable attack. The vulnerability is entirely in how the key gets agreed.

This is not hypothetical

NIST finalised its first post-quantum standards in August 2024. Chrome, Firefox and Cloudflare deployed hybrid post-quantum key exchange in production TLS before that.

No bound on exposure

A conventional breach has a knowable window. Harvest-now-decrypt-later has none: the capture happens quietly today; the exposure crystallises years later, for everything at once.

CHAPTER 02 Two different things share one name

“Quantum encryption” means two things.

The difference is not a technicality. It decides what hardware you need, what it costs, how far it reaches, and whether you can use it at all.

Quantum hardware encryption (QKD)

Physics as the lock

Purpose-built apparatus that uses the behaviour of individual photons to exchange a key between two fixed points. Measuring a quantum state disturbs it, so eavesdropping is physically detectable.

  • Single-photon source & detector at each end
  • Dedicated fibre or free-space link
  • A few hundred km without a trusted repeater
  • Distributes keys only; AES still encrypts
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC)

Mathematics as the lock

Ordinary software on ordinary computers, built on lattice problems believed to stay hard even for a quantum computer. No special hardware of any kind. This is how almin™ Seal is built.

  • Runs on any existing computer or browser
  • Reaches anywhere the internet, or a file, can go
  • Free to run; software only
  • Already in production TLS at major vendors
Property
QKD
PQC
What it is
Hardware exchanging a key via photons
Software using quantum-resistant mathematics
Hardware needed
Photon source, detectors, dedicated fibre
Any existing computer or browser
Typical reach
A few hundred km per link
Anywhere the internet, or a file, can reach
Cost to deploy
Specialised hardware, often per link
Free to run; software only
Used today
A handful of research & government links
Production TLS at Chrome, Firefox, Cloudflare

Asking “is QKD better than PQC” is like asking whether a bank vault is better than a padlock. It depends on what you protect, and how it needs to travel.

CHAPTER 03 What quantum hardware encryption actually is

Eavesdropping you can physically detect.

QKD encodes information onto individual photons sent down a fibre link. Its security doesn't come from being hard to compute; it comes from quantum mechanics itself: measuring a quantum state disturbs it. Read the photons in transit, and you leave a trace. Watch it happen:

Live simulation of quantum key distribution over fibre
ALICE BOB PHOTON SOURCE DETECTOR EVE EAVESDROPPER MEASUREMENT DETECTED. KEY DISCARDED CHANNEL CLEAN. KEY BIT COMMITTED
SHARED KEY

What that guarantee actually costs

/01

Dedicated hardware at both ends

A precisely calibrated single-photon source and detector. Off-the-shelf laptops cannot participate.

/02

A physical link between two fixed points

Purpose-built optical fibre, or line-of-sight free-space and satellite links. There is no “just connect over the internet.”

/03

Limited distance

Signal loss caps practical range at a few hundred kilometres, then each trusted repeater must itself be physically secured.

/04

Key distribution only

QKD establishes a shared secret; it encrypts nothing by itself. AES still does the actual work.

For two fixed, high-value sites such as two data centres or two government facilities, with the budget for dedicated hardware, QKD remains by some measures the gold standard. It was never designed for anything else.

“QKD protects a link. Most people need to protect a file. Those are not the same problem.”

CHAPTER 04 What almin™ Seal does instead

Not a single bet: two locks, one key.

Every file is sealed under two independent, unrelated key agreements running side by side. An attacker must break both the lattice problem behind ML-KEM and the elliptic curve behind X25519 to recover a single file's key. A flaw in either one alone, even in the newer lattice mathematics, is not enough.

ML-KEM-768 / 1024lattice-based · NIST FIPS 203 · no known attack, classical or quantum
X25519classical elliptic-curve · the backbone of modern TLS
HKDF-SHA-256both secrets combined into a single key
AES-256-GCMauthenticated, tamper-evident blocks
file.pqfsealed: content and name, for a named recipient's key
A third, separate layer: your passphrase, hardened with Argon2id (memory-hard by default; PBKDF2-SHA-256 available), locks the private key itself.
WHAT IT BUYS, HONESTLY STATED
/01

Harvest-now-decrypt-later resistance

A file sealed today stays unreadable once quantum computers exist, because the lattice half of the key agreement is not known to fall to one.

/02

No server, ever

Nothing is uploaded. Creating a key also downloads a working copy of the app itself, so a sealed file stays readable whatever happens to the website.

/03

Deliberate, no-recovery custody

The private key never leaves the device and is never seen by any server. There is no “forgot passphrase” path, by design rather than oversight.

/04

Honest limits

No independent professional security audit yet. JavaScript can't guarantee constant-time execution. A weak passphrase is still a weak passphrase.

/05

Verified against the specs

ML-KEM, Argon2id and Blake2b were written from their published specifications and checked against independent reference implementations, with Argon2id checked against the official RFC 9106 test vector.

CHAPTER 05 Side by side, in full

The vault and the padlock.

Property
Quantum hardware (QKD)
almin™ Seal
Basis of security
Physical laws of quantum mechanics
Hardness of lattice problems (ML-KEM) and elliptic-curve discrete log (X25519)
Hardware required
Photon source & detectors, dedicated fibre or free-space link
Any standard computer with a modern browser
Reach
Point-to-point, typically under a few hundred km without a trusted repeater
Anywhere a file can be sent: email, USB drive, cloud storage, the open internet
What it protects
Establishes a key between two fixed endpoints; another cipher encrypts the data
Seals the file itself, content and name, for a named recipient's key
Eavesdropping detection
Physically detectable: measurement disturbs the quantum state
Not applicable; security rests on computational hardness
Deployed today as
Research & government backbones; a handful of metropolitan links worldwide
Standard web technology, in browsers already on billions of devices
Cost to try
Specialised hardware; significant capital outlay per link
Free, today, in the browser already open

“Quantum-resistant” does not mean quantum hardware. Seal uses no quantum phenomena at all, only mathematics believed to be hard even for a quantum computer.

CHAPTER 06 Getting started, in five steps

Five minutes. Zero installation.

1

Open almin™ Seal

Visit almin.co.uk/seal in any modern browser. Nothing to install.

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2

Choose a strength & create a key

ML-KEM-768 is the sensible default; ML-KEM-1024 for the highest level. Set a passphrase. Four or more random words is a solid floor, and Argon2id is applied automatically.

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3

Save all three files somewhere safe

Your public key, your private key, and a working copy of almin™ Seal itself, named to the version that made it.

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4

Seal a file

Choose the recipient's public key (or your own), drop in any file, and download the resulting .pqf container.

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5

Unseal it later

Open the matching private key with its passphrase, drop in the .pqf file, and the original is restored under its original name.

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ONE HABIT WORTH KEEPING. there is no password recovery. Losing the passphrase means losing access to that key, permanently, by design. Keep it somewhere durable, and keep a backup of anything you seal.
Closing note

Public standards, privately assembled, honestly described.

Neither approach is the universally “right” answer. QKD remains the strongest guarantee for two fixed, high-value points. almin™ Seal exists for everyone else, which is almost everyone: anyone who needs to protect a file, sent to an arbitrary recipient, using the computer they already own, starting today.

Seal your first file (free)→